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Carl von Clausewitz’s Military Theory
An Examination

Michael Myers
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I
Carl von Clausewitz (1780 –1831) stands out from other writers of military classics
because rather than looking at war as purely a matter of mathematical theory of probability and
calculation, he instead examines it critically seeing war also as a political instrument. To do this
he, broke war down into its fundamental parts and recognized them all as necessary aspects to
his theory. This is unlike many other military theorists such as Antoine Henri Jomini (17791869) who placed no emphasis on political goals. Clausewitz’s work was highly influenced by
the Enlightenment and sought to examine warfare as a rational tool for political policy.
Concerned with the political and military aspect, like Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527),
Clausewitz was addressing the concept of war as pertaining to a nation state or a political entity.
Because of his grounding in Enlightenment values, Clausewitz examines war as a rational option
in politics and not just a random act of human emotion. Thus his On War, though written in the
early nineteenth century, continues to influence political and military leaders today because it
remains an applicable study of the application of force between political entities, taking into
account not just mathematical studies, but elements of human nature and the primacy of aligning
political and military goals in war.
II
Secondary sources not only help in the understanding of the primary source material but
also demonstrate how the topic has been treated by other historians, going so far as allowing a
researcher to see how views on the topic may have changed over the years. Clausewitz’s On
War: A Biography 1 , Clausewitz: A Biogrphay 2 , and Clausewitz and the State 3 , are quite
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obviously most interested in the life and development of Carl von Clausewitz. These three
books contain their own analysis of his best known work On War but also use many of his other
works and letters to his wife and friends to develop not only his theories but him as a person as
well.

The development of Clausewitz and his theories are closely tied in Parkinson’s

Clausewitz: A Biography and Paret’s Clausewitz and the State. Both of these focus on the man
and the specific events and trials that lead him to the theories of politics and war he is now best
known for. Hew Strachan takes Clausewitz’s on War: A Biography in a slightly different
direction. Strachan first details Clausewitz’s development then transitions into a discussion and
analysis of his work.
Paret and Parkinson do disagree on some aspects of Clausewitz’s life. The discrepancy
between them is only on the matter of the Clausewitz family’s ties to nobility and the reason for
the discharge of Clausewitz’s father. Despite this these biographies confirm some other much
more important factors in his life. They give valuable insight into the education that Clausewitz
received early in his military career as well as demonstrating his military background. The other
important aspect that they agree on are his mentors and the authors that he had read, building a
strong argument basing his education heavily in Enlightenment.
The other four monographs whose subject is Clausewitz, while having biographical
sections, focus on the political or military implications of his theory on the world. Philosophers
of Peace and War by W. B. Gallie 4 and The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and
Orders by Richard Ned Lebow 5 place On War, in a social context. While Clausewitz and his
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theory of war and politics are examined by both of these books his work is not their focus, rather
it is part of their examination of historical political influences.
Philosophers of Peace and War is an examination five authors who wrote on peace and
war that Gallie felt had the longest lasting impact on our modern perceptions of these two
subjects. His desire was to create interest in knowledge of works of Kant, Clausewitz, Marx and
Engle, and Tolstoy in the hope that students would delve back into these authors. Gallie openly
admits to seeking only the “meta-narrative” of these works. Philosopheres of Peace and War is a
very short book and only give a brief overview and look at any of these authors. This is however
Gallie’s primary goal. He only wished to give a bit of what each author was about and for this
analysis and comparison to examine their overarching views on peace and or war. Gallie found
that Clausewitz had removed himself from the more traditional analytical scope of the military,
one that focuses on the technical aspects, and tackled it from a societal standpoint.
Lebow in Tragic Vision of Politics is using Clausewitz as part of an examination of the
Cold War world. He uses writers who have influence the western views of politics and war as a
means by which to base interaction between states and the direction of politics following the
Second World War. What Lebow is writing specifically to is American hegemony and its
imperialistic drives. He cautions draws interpretations form different time periods but the lesson
he seeks to impress upon his readers form Clausewitz is the folly of allowing there to become a
gulf between political and military policy.
The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and
Their Impact on the German Conduct in the Two World Wars by Jehuda L. Wallach 6 and On
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Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas by Hugh Smith 7 are more militarily oriented
works. As a result both these monographs focus much more on Carl von Clausewitz than the
previous two discussed. Wallach as most would suspect when studying Clausewitz is looking to
establish relations between the military and politics. He is however looking specifically at the
effects that Clausewitz’s ideas had on the German State in both World Wars. On the other hand
Hugh Smith systematically breaks down the development and concept of Clauswitzian theory in
an effort to establish the viability of On War into the present day. Both men arrive at the
conclusion, much like Lebow and Gallie, which is that Clausewitz is more often then naught
misinterpreted by his readers as they look at only On War and none of his other works which
would aid in an interpretation of his theories.

Wallach concludes that the Germans

misinterpreted Clausewitz’s theories and it was Schlieffen’s ideas that predominantly shape the
German war machine from 1914 to 1945.

Smith’s conclusion is that in present times

Clausewitz’s warning of maintaining the political object as the military object is more important
than ever.
All four of these sources use both secondary and primary sources. Again, they all claim
that the best way to interpret Clausewitzian theory is by having his other works and letters
available. Unfortunately they are relatively inaccessible as many continue to be only in the
original German. They share many secondary sources, of which Clausewitz and the State stands
out as a cornerstone in background on Clausewitz. What can be learned from all of these sources
is that there is a general consensus among English speaking scholars that earlier interpretations
of On War, largely in French, do not utilize many of the other texts written by Clausewitz to aid
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in the interpretation. Additionally these sources help to identify the intellectual background for
Clausewitz’s work On War.
III
To better understand his thoughts it is necessary to look at Carl von Clausewitz’s early
history and not just the time period in which he lived. Clausewitz was born on 1 June 1780. His
father, Friedrich Gabriel, began the tradition of military service in the Clausewitz family. His
suffered from having only tenuous claims to nobility as the von had been dropped by distant
ancestors who wanted to enter into the clergy and teaching professions. However, when he
entered the service, Friedrich began to use von once again. He served in the Seven Years’ War
as a Lieutenant in the Prussian Army. He was discharged due to an injury that crippled his right
hand and he was given a civilian post of Royal tax collector in the town of Burg. Due to his
father’s military ties Clausewitz from a very early age was exposed to military affairs. Where
his ancestors had pursued academic vocations and enjoyed a great deal of education,
Clausewitz’s education at the local school was meager. Friedrich enjoyed the company of
soldiers and was often visited by his old comrades many of whom were still in the service of the
Prussian Army.

Clausewitz enlisted into the Prussian Army, following the path of his older

brothers took, at the age of twelve. Because of his ties to nobility, no matter how feeble,
Clausewitz was accepted into the service as a Fahnenjunker 8 , a flag officer, a position presented
to anyone qualified and belonging to any noble family.
War opened the same year of his enlisting between France and Prussia as the French
Revolution threatened to spill across the Rhine. After only a few months Clausewitz was
promoted to Ensign, a full officer, and by the age of fifteen he was promoted to Second8
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Lieutenant while serving in Prussia’s Rhine Campaigns against the French during their
revolution. He had received his second promotion by the time King Friedrich Wilhem signed the
Peace of Basle with France. Following his enrollment at the Military Academy in Berlin
Clausewitz was assigned to Prince August, son of crown Prince Ferdinand heir to King Friedrich,
as his adjutant. Shortly thereafter, in 1806, Prussia was at war again with the French, this time as
Napoleon sought to bring the French Revolution to the rest of Europe. The Prussian military
suffered two defeats at the battles of Jena and Auerstadt. Clausewitz was present at Auerstadt
and captured by the French at Prenzlau when his unit surrendered which only served to reinforce
in him the need for Prussian military reform. Until 1809 he would remain Prince August’s Aid
at which time Scharnhorst brought Clausewitz on to his staff. After their crushing defeat at the
hands of the French, King Friedrich Wilhelm III appointed Heinrich Friedrich Karl Freiherr von
Stein (1757-1831), a Prussian minister, to revamp the Prussian state. Additionally, the king
appointed Clausewitz’s old mentor Scharnhorst as president of his military reorganization
commission. Clausewitz served on this commission eventually running Scharnhorst’s office
until 1810. 9 Clausewitz was then reassigned to be the tutor for Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm
IV and a professor at the Allgemeine Military Academy. Following this France and Russia
would go to war and Clausewitz would not stand idle by while Prussia allowed itself to be
occupied by France. He resigned from Prussian service and commissioned into the Russian
Army from 1812 until in 1814 he was reaccepted back into Prussian service. Clausewitz went
back to his native country’s service when it assembled an army and, having formed an alliance
with Austria and Russia, counter attacked back into France. By 1815 Carl von Clausewitz was
promoted to Major-General and served as Chief-of-Staff for troops stationed at Koblenz. He was
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reassigned in 1818 to the Allegmeine Military Academy again but only in an administrative
capacity. Clausewitz’s final post with a line unit was in 1830 when he went to serve as Chief of
Staff for a force deployed to the Polish border before returning home in 1831 shortly before
passing away.
During his service Clausewitz would not be assigned to any command capacity following
the Rhine Campaigns against France. It was however, during his early experiences campaigning
in France following the Rhine Campaigns that led him to the development of the importance of
political goals for military action. The Rhine Campaigns ended after six months of the Prussian
army wandering aimless and vulnerable in French territory following the fall of Mainz.
Clausewitz watched as the army lost moral and a sense of direction, what started as an exciting
and unimpeded invasion of France ended as a bedraggled and disenchanted army fearful of
French reprisal withdrew to the east bank of the Rhine. Even though after this he would not
receive a battlefield command does not say that he was unable to serve with distinction.
Clausewitz came to be known as an excellent staff officer which resulted in his numerous
administrative appointments. His experiences in the field as a staff officer not only exposed him
to danger but also placed him in a position to deal with the larger scale supply, command, and
administrative issues armies on campaign face regularly.
Clausewitz’s long term experience with the folly of an old and traditionally stiff Prussian
practices drove him to aid Scharnhorst with the reform of the Prussian military. The reforms that
Scharnhorst and he desired to implement needed coinciding civil reform. Help came in the form
of Heinrich Friedrich Karl Freiherr von Stein assigned to constitutional reform and a friend of
Clausewitz. Military reform would not happen until the French occupation of Prussia following
1806 and the new political reforms Stein began to implement in Prussia. “A change to open
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order battle tactics meant nothing less than a modification of the whole Prussian social
system…” 10 The theory Clausewitz wrote of came about as a result of his experience both on
the field of war and politics.
Following the Peace of Basle Carl von Clausewitz was forced to further his education.
Because there were at that time no more battles by which he could prove his ability a better
education would be the best chance for him to receive any sort of advancement. 11 Following the
treaty Clausewitz sought additional education on his own at first in the town of Neu-Rupin where
his regiment was stationed for peacetime garrison. Here, amidst constant drilling, he would
endeavored to educate himself as best he could and had also enrolled in a local school to
improved upon his command of mathematics, history, and French. The education Clausewitz
managed to get from his self motivated studies and what was offered at the school was lacking.
To remedy his situation he enrolled in the Institution for the Young Officers in Berlin. Though
he managed to meet the minimum standards on the entry exam Clausewitz would not have been
able to attend the school if not for the patronage of Gerhard von Scharnhorst. 12 Clausewitz’s
reassignment to the Military Academy was when he took the time to look back on his
experiences and begin work on his book On War. 13
Scharnhorst was at the time of Clausewitz’s arrival assigned to be the superintendent of
the artillery department of the military academe. Here not only was Carl von Clausewitz
introduced to a more formal military education in tactics and military history but was able to
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attend philosophical lectures as well under Professor Kiesewtter at the College of Medicine
whose lectures focused on the work of Immanuel Kant. Additionally, while studying at the
academy Clausewitz took up reading the political philosophies of Dupan, Voltaire, Montesquieu,
and Machiavelli. 14 He also read the works of the German poets Schiller, Goethe, Holderlin.
With exception of Machiavelli, Clausewitz’s education was dominated by the works of noted
Enlightenment authors. 15
IV
To understand Clausewitz’s intellectual development it is important to not only
understand his life and experiences but his times and the movement that is known as the
Enlightenment as well.

The Enlightenment was a Eurocentric intellectual movement the

definition of which is difficult to define with certainty but most often what can be related to a
few core values that would shape European thought. What can be said about the Enlightenment,
with any certainty is that it was most concerned with the human condition as regulated by
rationality. It was a movement away from the constraints of tradition, religion, and superstition
where science, and not blind faith, was increasingly used to explain the world and its processes.
This development of thought challenged not only the relation between people and the church but
all social orders and affected all social and political strata of the eighteenth century. 16 This
resulted in the foundation of the United States on a constitution and rule by the people as well as
14
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the French Revolution.

However, its effects can also be seen in what became known as

Enlightened Absolutism.

In the case of Eastern Europe; Prussia, Austria, and Russia this

developed in the monarch a sense of the need to modernize and assimilate new technologies even
to allow greater freedoms in their social systems. These changes were made as a matter of
pragmatism, in the hope that a modern state with citizens who enjoyed some amount of freedom
would in the end prove to be a stronger more prosperous nations thereby ensuring their positions
as benevolent monarchs. A profound change in Prussia especially is the adoption of accepting
non-nobility or those who had questionable claims to nobility into the officer corps and in higher
government on the basis of ability and talent rather than purely by birth. 17 This was an early
modification, and what truly allowed first Clausewitz’s father then himself to become officers. It
had become obvious that there was a need for more talent within the Prussian bureaucracy and
military and as a result restrictions had become increasingly lax until the reforms that were
instituted after 1806.
V
Written between campaigns in the later years of his life, Clausewitz would die of cholera
on the Polish border, in conjunction with the reforms sweeping both the Prussian military and
state. It was a consolidation, or would have been had he lived to see it to completion, of the
lessons Clausewitz had learned from a life time of war as reflected in the Enlightenment values
that he had grew up with. “On War seeks to reconcile the theoretical rigor demanded by the
Enlightenment with the intractability of war claimed by the Counter-Enlightenment.” 18 Or,
rather, Clausewitz was not only satisfied with pure theory but in exploring the limits of that
theory with regard to the reality of the world in which all activity truly takes place. On War was
17
18
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published in 1832 so it is important to remember that his work was published after his death.
The result of this is that it is unrefined, at times choppy or repetitive and in other areas
contradicts its self.
This section introduces and explores the fundamental concepts of Clausewitz’s theory of
war. The insight of On War is not just for the military minded it was written for “the Statesman
and General” not two different people but what Clausewitz saw as a single person. 19
War is an instrument of policy; it must necessarily bear its character, it must
measure with its scale: the conduct of War, in its great features, is therefore
policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen, but does not on that
account cease to think according to its own laws. 20
War then is also defined by the many political and social aspects of a state which reside outside
of the activity of combat. Though it would seem an understatement in the present day Clausewitz
put more emphasis on the importance of a political goal for war. Jomini is noted as summing up
the political influence on was as no more important than that the civilian leader should chose his
most able commander to lead the war. 21 It is in essence a societal function the terms of which are
determined by the people who prosecute it.

As can be seen from the afore mentioned quote

Clausewitz dealing with the dual nature of war which is to what he writes his work. There is both
the General’s desire to be victorious and defeat the enemy but also the Politician who has a
political goal he seeks in the endeavor. One must be submissive to the other and in the case of
Clausewitz; he believed it to be the military aim directed by the political.
Clausewitz felt that to write on war he needed to not only define the concept but elaborate
on all of it’s aspects as they influence and relate to one another. Without establishing this, his
readers would have no starting point from which to reference his viewpoints. Book I “On the
19
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Nature of War” is a lengthy discussion that gives war a finite definition, examines a number of
abstract military concepts, and acknowledges that war will have to faces from an academic
standpoint. In this first “book” he looks at the underlying currents of war, both in how it is
waged and when it is waged. All successive books in On War are based on how war and its
nature are defined and relate back to book I.
War, the act itself, is defined by Clausewitz as essentially a contest of strength. He opens
with the view of it being little more than a duel on a grand scale. The endpoint of war being that
through force one side will overcome the other and be able to impress its desires or “will” on the
other. The victor then is the side that is able to dictate terms to the other. Clausewitz continues
to whittle down this concept until he arrives at the simple statement of “War therefore is an act of
violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil [sic] our will.”22 Here also at his definition of
war Clausewitz emphasizes that the means of war is physical forces and the object of war the
object being the submission of the opponent.
It is in the sections following his definition of war that introduces concepts where
Clausewitz contradicts himself albeit with good reason. When writing On War Clausewitz
developed two different ways of considering war, and not from the aspect of fighting a war such
as limited and total war. In translation these two ideas are best described as war in the abstract,
also termed absolute war, and war in the real world. His development of these two ideas is
simple. The absolute to Clausewitz represents war in its perfect form, unrestricted by the
realities of existence.
Abstract war allows for what he calls the utmost use of force and exertion of powers,
discussed later. Real war is the conduct of war as constrained by various factors as simple as
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reality or constraining “human” elements. The conflict between the abstract logical war and the
reality of war is a recurring theme in the opening sections of On War. This ends up being much
of his discussion on theory as, theoretical concepts work wonderfully in an abstract world but
that reality has too many variables in it to be place in a simplified system. An absolute war is
one where the involved parties have not context to one another social or political, there is no
ambition or aggressiveness on either’s part and both lacking any concern for the past or present.
It is what Hugh Smith calls “Pure War” which encapsulates the war as “a violent collision pure
and simple” it is war without policy. 23

VI
One issue that Carl von Clausewitz covers in the nature of war is the concept he calls
reciprocal actions. In his definition of war there are three of these reciprocal actions that escalate
the hostilities between states at war with one another. These reciprocal actions arise from
different aspects of Clausewitz’s nature of war. The first reciprocal action corresponds with the
use of force, the second reciprocal action is dictated by the goal of war, and the third reciprocal
action is the escalation of resources devoted to the war effort. All three of these reciprocal
actions imply from the aspect of the absolute war that the conflict will escalate continuously until
one side achieves victory over the other.
The first reciprocal action looks at the “utmost use of force” best described as the scale of
force used in aggression. Force in this case is the means by which either side seeks to make the
other capitulate. This is taking into account the methods of the military not resources committed
to the conflict. Here Clausewitz is referring to the actions taken rather than units or equipment
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involved. “We therefore repeat our proposition, that War is an act of violence pushed to its
utmost bounds; as one side dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action,
which logically must lead to an extreme.” 24

The greatest use of force would be the total

destruction of an enemy’s ability to wage war such as attacking civilians, destroying
infrastructure, or giving no quarter to surrendering soldiers. There is no grantee that moral and
ethical compunction will limit this at all.25 However there is some ground given by Clausewitz
regarding moral limits to warfare, “…for in such dangerous things as War, the errors which
proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst…” and in the same section “If the Wars of
civilized people are less cruel and destructive than those of savages, the difference arises from
the social condition of both States and in their relations to each other.” 26 This first reciprocal
action then is that one state will use some amount of force to impose it’s will on its opponent
who will in return respond with a greater use of force ore suffer defeat.
The second reciprocal action is in regard to the primary goal in war. As the goal of a war
is, as in wrestling, to impose one’s will on another the goal in war is to eliminate the others
ability to resist. War then can only end, again in the absolute sense, when one side has disarmed
the other. So long as this is the case war will continue until victory has been assured and there
enemy no longer poses any threat of violence. “As long as the enemy is not defeated, he may
defeat me; then I shall be no longer my own master; he will dictate the law to me as I did to
him.” 27 The second reciprocal action is based in fear of retaliation for actions previously taken
during the course of the war.
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The final reciprocal action is the fullest exertion of powers. Powers here refers more to
the resources such as people and materials that contribute to the war effort. The third reciprocal
action then is that as one side increases the resources it is devoting to the war effort it will gain
and advantage which its opponent will seek to overcome. There are two sources of power one
being physical in the sense of resources available and the other in the drive of a nation to
continue in its efforts. “This is expressed by the product of two factors which cannot be
separated, namely, the sum of available means and the strength of the Will.” 28 The concept
developing form this reciprocal action will have varying interpretations in succeeding years.29
The “Will” returns later in the discussion as an important aspect of success against an opponent.
The need for reciprocal actions stems from Clausewitz’s logical approach. Clausewitz
reasons his way through the theory by way of dialectic. He forms the argument and defends it in
as if in conversation to help show the line of though. As he does so it becomes more apparent
that there is a need for a system in which two political entities would continue on the path to
war. 30

This scientific approach of hypothesis, observations, analysis stems from the

Enlightenment’s emphasis on a scientific methodology. As in any other science Clausewitz was
looking for an explanation for the currents moving states to war and then driving them forward to
extremes.
When looking at war Clausewitz has to contend with again reality and theory. This is in
many cases considered to be his greatest effort and contribution to military scholarship. There
are three factors that he attributes to causing variables in war forcing it out of the realm of the

28
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absolute. He uses these three factors to show that the reality of war is not only both a play on
chance and a logical endeavor that can be calculated but also possesses the addition of the
random unpredictable nature of the peoples involved. The factors are developed as the people,
the military, and the government all of which contribute to every aspect of how when and why a
war is fought. Ultimately these things and the clash between them create the unpredictability of
war. 31 The contemplation of unpredictable factors of the human element was one of the things
that set Clausewitz apart from his most well known contemporary Antoine-Henri Jomini. 32 Of
war Clausewitz writes:
War is… a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its elements,
hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind instinct; of the play of
probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; and of the
subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purly to the
reason. 33
Each part of this trinity is interconnected to Clausewitz. They represent the all elements of war
that must be accounted for. Unlike Jomini, Clausewitz felt that it was necessary to develop not
necessarily a strategic theory for war but to look at the fundamental and unchanging aspects of
war and develop an understanding of their relation to develop a flexible theory of war.34 Given a
background in a reorganizing military having fought an entrenched dogma of military principles
to achieve reform, Clausewitz chose to focus on a theory that would transcend the restriction
technology and tactics.
People, the participants who carry out the actions involved in the given situation, are a
constant variable in any event war or otherwise. Where previously military theorists had focused
31
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on the mathematical probabilities involved it was always done so while leaving out the human
element. 35 Until Clausewitz attempted to tackle the problems created by these immeasurable
factors military theorists simply left them out of their equations and focused on the calculable
elements of war. These previous conclusions were falsified; Clausewitz’s contemporaries and
forbearers on military writing had simply assumed unpredictable elements to be even between
the involved parties. 36 The incalculable did not fit well into the scientific methodology that was
so desirable to the enlightened thinker.
“People” stands for the population of nations as a whole and what Clausewitz was
concerned about with them was their support of the effort of war. He considers this aspect of
war to be “blind instinct”. The people are most prone to being swayed by emotions. Therefore,
their ferocity in combat, if they are soldiers, or their willingness to sacrifice for the war effort, in
civilians, is dependant on culture. This is considered the irrational portion of war. It includes the
sentiments and feelings involved in the conflict.
The general and his army are given to the realm of probability. The human aspect is
taken from the army in this factor as the motivations of the people who make up the army are
tied to the previous factor. Clausewitz sees the military’s part in war is one of probabilities and
calculations of strength both inherent strength of arms, technology, and numbers or by position
on the field. These are the things that the General is most concerned with at the moment of battle
and make war for him a deadly game of chance.
The government is the logical element in Clausewitz’s trinity of war. Because he has
defined war as being a tool of policy it is then the responsibility of the government body to set a
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logical or military goal that will reasonably achieve its political goal. For Clausewitz this is the
only pure place of logic and reason as government bodies must ensure that the military goal and
political goal are aligned or else the war loses all meaning.
With regard to disarming the enemy there is another trinity in Clausewitz’s thinking. To
disarm a nation he says there are three things to keep in mind with regard to the enemy; military
power, the country, and the will. To achieve victory then enemy has to be disarmed and
therefore their military power must be eliminated and their country conquered so that another
force cannot be raised. Clausewitz adds that these two things can occur but in the end so long as
the enemy possesses the will to fight the previous achievements mean nothing. He writes that to
break the will of the enemy what must happen for there to be a victor is that one of the opponents
must find that the odds are no in their favor and that it is not worth while to continue the conflict.
So then as the primary goal in a war is to disarm the enemy the best way to achieve this is
to convince the enemy that war is not a feasible to continue, or even start. “As War is no act of
blind passion, but is dominated by the political object, therefore the value of that object
determines the measure of the sacrifice by which it is to be purchased.” 37 Simply put when a
war is conducted it is done so at the consideration what is expected to be gained from the conflict
as well as what is accepted as a reasonable cost to buy that gain. This is a concept that was
driven home during his first campaign, while yet a boy he recognized that his unit’s aimless
wandering in the French country side was a pointless endever that was in all a wasteful risk as
there was no guiding objective for the regiment. 38 On the other hand this also represents the
amount of force a state would be willing to apply to the enemy. It is not only advocating for
frugal use of resources but of moderating what actions are acceptable in an army’s conduct of
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war. Victory then comes when one side can convince the other that this is no longer a point to
continue hostilities. Rather, when one the will of one side can be overcome. Outside of this the
threat of continued conflict still looms.
Carl von Clausewitz’s theory relies upon what he outlines as the nature of war as
previously described. On the whole then the key factors to his theory are that: First, war is an
instrument of policy, second, as war is a tool of policy the political object will determine then
forces and resources necessary to achieve success, and third, states arrive at war and continue
conflict based on reciprocal actions which will ever push each other to an extreme. Essentially
all other aspects of On War return to these three principles in some manner.
Final extraneous elements to Clausewitz’s theory that do not necessarily return to one of
the parts of the nature of war are the genius for war and the value of studying history. Both of
these points appear in his book and demonstrate values of the Enlightenment but do not
specifically return to his binding of military and political ideas in his theory so much as the
combination of rationality and realism. Genius is focused on the part of the general who
commands the army, but can also be likened to commander in chief of the military. History is
important of the grounding in reality it brings to the theory of war, in this case his theory. Study
of the past is important for the statesman and general for it helps them to recognize the instability
of theories that ignore the context of society.
We know very well that this word is used in many significations which are very
different both in extent and nature, and that with many of these significations it is
a very difficult task to define the essence of Genius; but as we neither profess to
be philosopher nor grammarian, we must be allowed to keep to the meaning usual
in ordinary language, and to understand by ‘genius’ a very high mental capacity
for certain employments. 39
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As can be seen from the selection, genius simply denotes someone with an outstanding
mental aptitude for military applications.

This is in converse to Jomini who rather than

emphasizing flexibility and genius instead focuses on concepts of geometrical military theory.40
This concept of genius, or aptitude, is all encompassing in On War and is not simply limited to a
commander’s capacity for the tactical and strategic with regard to the conduct of one in war. It
carries over into the individuals fighting as well. In this section the additional ramifications of
genius are that of courage and individual imitative, or the will to act of one’s own accord in the
conduct of a battle. This has multiple applications as one of the reforms that Clausewitz, along
with Scharnhorst pushed for in the Prussian military was that of increasing the use of skirmishers
in the infantry. 41
Though that is not to say that genius has no place in the mind of the leadership involved
where “Good generalship requires effective responses to rapidly changing political, strategic and
tactical circumstances. Assessing all these factors is a ‘colossal task,’ and beyond the powers of
the normal person.” 42 On the part of the leadership in combat there are a multitude of stressful
factors that demand their attention. To this Clausewitz writes “resolution is indebted to a special
direction of the mind for its existence, a direction which belongs to a strong head rather than to a
brilliant one.” 43 He is referring here to the stresses of battle, that while under the pressure of
combat it is not simply enough to be intelligent, even to the point of being termed brilliant.
Rather, it is of greatest importance that one retains their mental capacity to continue to forward
toward the objective. The scope of this can be limited to another trio, where first the leader can
apply the rules, of war, to a military situation, second they can maintain the presence of mind in
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combat to make a decision and finally have internalized a logical process by which to analyze
the data quickly. 44 He was writing of a talented individual. He did not in any way reference
class or nobility. As was reflected in the currents of the Prussian Officer Corps, leadership and
ranks, with exception of the royal line, was not a justifying reason for command. 45
History took a special importance to Clausewitz. They were a means by which to study
war and the influence of social and political factors in combat. History, in effect, offered case
studies for him to lend cultural contexts to battle. Clausewitz notes that there are many things in
military theory that can be calculated.

As has been discussed this is how many of his

contemporaries and predecessors developed their concepts, purely on the basis of calculation and
logic leaving out irritating irregularities. As Clausewitz had already developed a sense that
variable elements must also be included in theory the best way to acknowledge these was to
examine their effects in engagements.
That iron ball to which powder has given a velocity of 1,000 feet in a second,
smashes every living thing which it toughes in its course is intelligible in itself;
experience is not required to tell us that the Physical is not the only effect which
we have to sudy, it is the moral which we are in search of, and that con only be
ascertained by experience; and there is no other way of learning and appreciating it
but by experience. 46
While Clausewitz endorses the use of history to fine the moral truths of war, he also cautions
about verifying the historical truth in the account. Because he noted that the viability of the
history studied would decrease the further into the historical record a source came from, he
studied much more the wars of the seventeenth century where many of his contemporaries
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focused on classical studies. 47 Clausewitz was even critical of Machiavelli whose political ideas
he admired very much. His criticism of the Renaissance writer’s military strategy was the same
that he found fault with in his peers, that of being entirely too focused on classical military
literature. 48 Clausewitz did not believe there was an undeniable truth to war and that the battles
of antiquity were too dated to help on the modern battlefield.
VII
The study of Clausewitz tends toward the development of him and his work as a product
of the Enlightenment. The secondary sources gathered for this examination of Clausewitz tend
toward either biographical sources or political analysis of his work.

As expected in the

monographs their authors develop extensive biographical detail regarding Clausewitz to form a
base by which they can examine his work. Outside the general consensus of all these sources of
Clausewitz’s background they also seem to defend him as being simply misunderstood and
treated unfairly. Though no disparaging text was found for this examination this is likely to one
of the key reasons why On War itself was slow to produce a following.
Carl von Clausewitz’s work was largely inaccessible to the rest of the world. Because of
its posthumous publishing On War was, and continues to be, difficult to read. It did not gather
many readers even in Germany for some time after its publishing. It was considered too difficult
to read and as it tended towards a philosophical discussion of war. This was in a time when the
preferred understanding of military theory was scientific it was slow to attract the attention of its
assumed military audience, especially when other contemporary works were more in line with
the standard scientific approach and had been published in more than just German. Clausewitz’s
on War: A Biography takes the most interest in On War’s various translations and development.
47
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The first English translation was not published until 1873 and the book itself became popular in
France before it ever did in the nations of its mother tongue.
Carl von Clausewitz’s On War continues to appear on the reading lists of war colleges all
over the world. He arrived at a concept for military strategy that tried to overcome the dogma of
his age in the use of a scientific theory that he believed to be to rigid to appropriately explain war
and its relationship to the state. Through personal experience in a lifetime of war and study
Clausewitz arrived at a conclusion that the military arm of a state needed to be given a political
aim if utilized. Without this kind direction, as He witnessed as a young lieutenant, an army is
likely to wander aimlessly and at its own peril. In effect is becomes a waste of resources and
runs the risk of destruction with no benefit to the nation. He relates the practical and theoretical
and advocates for the study of war to demonstrate the incalculable in war.
In the context of the Enlightenment in Germany the military reform the Clausewitz
advocated for and that are reflected in On War shows a trend in changing though regarding
warfare in Prussia. Clausewitz’s ideas were arrived at through a combination of his personal
education and experiences fighting in the Napoleonic Wars. Through his influences both martial
and domestic Clausewitz drafted a military theory that reflected the need for flexibility and
change that could bee seen not just in the Prussian state. As he had to break from the scientific
method, held in the highest esteem during the Enlightenment, it can be said of Clausewitz that he
wrote to the Counter-Enlightenment.

However, his meticulous breakdown of war into its

fundamental parts and the sharp examination of those parts is a result of his Enlightenment
background.
Of Prussia and its culture much can be learned from studying On War. When writing this
book Clausewitz was part of a movement to reform the Prussian army to be more effective. As
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stated above, this could not happen without also a change in the social system of Prussia, it
would have been impractical, as well as dangerous for the monarchy, to reform the military
without seeing first to its own domestic structures. This also shows how very close the civilian
state and the military machine were interwoven in Prussia.
On War itself falls in an ambiguous place in academics. It is in essence military theory;
however strategy and tactics are of less concern than the fundamental nature of war and its
reflection on society. It had been read by statesmen, academics, and military professionals. All
have found some lesson to take away from it, either in appropriately directing military operations
or simply learning new insights into a militarized society. On War is more than purely military
theory, it has a place as an item of intellectual history and social history as well.
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